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The empirical study of the impact of trade liberalization has not convinced the skeptics about the economic 
gains after trade reforms. Some have even argued that trade reforms have led to economic collapse and to 
deindustrialization. Using a sample that excludes countries that were subject to major exogenous disruptions, 
we note that post-reform economic growth was 1.2 percentage points higher than before the reforms. This is 
remarkable considering that pre-reform periods were characterized by highly expansionary state policies and 
large external borrowing, and that we eliminate the crisis years that preceded trade liberalization in the 
comparisons. Through multivariate fixed effects estimations we calculate that annual per capita GDP growth 
rates increased by up to 2.6 percentage points after the trade reforms, compared to a counterfactual that takes 
into consideration the evolution of several growth determinants. Moreover, trade liberalization has been 
followed by an acceleration in investment, exports of goods and services, and manufacturing exports, and as 
opposed to common belief, outward orientation did not lead to significant deindustrialization and actually 
seems to have increased export diversification. Acceleration occurred irrespective of income per capita level 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
There is as yet no conclusive evidence about the economic impact of trade liberalization. Skeptics 
have shown the methodological shortcomings of the statistical techniques used in the studies to 
demonstrate the benefits of trade policy openness (e.g. Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000 (RR); Rodrik, 
2000). They also cite East Asian countries as examples of protective trade policies boosting economic 
growth. Liberalization supporters (e.g. Baldwin, 2003; Warner, 2003; Cline, 2004) claim that despite its 
caveats, the existing evidence indicates that open trade policies lead to better economic performance, 
stressing that there is no systematic evidence confirming the opposite hypothesis that protectionism 
leads to higher growth. Such different readings of the existing evidence demonstrate the 
inconclusiveness and highly ideological nature of the debate. 
RR correctly note that trade theory does not conclude that under all circumstances reducing trade 
barriers leads to higher output. First, from a static point of view, reducing trade barriers that aimed to 
tackle market failures such as positive production externalities in import-competing sectors, would 
actually lead to a reduction of output. Second, under classical assumptions of constant returns to scale 
and assuming exogenous technological change, trade barriers have no effect on long-run growth, and 
only increase growth during the transition to a new steady state. Third, under several models of 
endogenous growth trade liberalization boosts output growth for the whole world, but not for all 
countries, depending on their initial endowments and levels of technological development.  
However, in the particular context in which trade liberalization was undertaken in developing 
countries there was a strong presumption that dismantling trade barriers would lead to higher output 
levels and growth. First, in the overwhelming majority of developing countries, trade policy had fallen 
prey to rent-seeking and resulted in excessive levels of protection to politically powerful groups without 
any consideration of technical criteria. Such inefficient trade policy regimes led to isolation of many   3
small economies and therefore had a catastrophic effect on their output. Hence dismantling them was 
expected to induce economic recovery. Second, the economic stagnation generated during the period of 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was believed to be so significant, that even without assuming 
endogeneous technological change, the move to a free trade steady state was expected to take long 
enough that trade liberalization would lead to higher output growth for a decade or more. Since most 
empirical exercises in this literature typically considered 10 to 15 years after reform, trade liberalization 
should result in positive and significant estimates of its impact on growth, even if the technological 
change was exogeneous. Finally, increased trade is likely to bring higher growth to all countries under 
endogeneous growth models if we assume the existence of technological spillovers (Feenstra, 2004), 
and economists supportive of an outward orientation expected that the acceleration in exports, imports 
of intermediate inputs and foreign direct investment, prompted by trade policy openness, would lead to 
such spillovers. 
Many have questioned the conclusions that trade reforms have led to better growth performance, 
and some have even gone ahead to argue that trade liberalization has been detrimental to the long-run 
growth of countries, especially in Africa. Some have suggested also that trade reforms have led to the 
“deindustrialization”. Thus the question of what happened to countries after their trade reforms 
continues to be an important issue in the policy discussions of many developing countries. A key issue 
about this debate is that, almost all developing countries have liberalized their trade regimes over the 
last few decades (IEG, 2006). Thus, the issue of what happened to these countries is of interest beyond 
the question of whether or not all the changes can be attributed solely to the trade reforms. 
By correcting several methodological deficiencies in existing event studies of trade reforms, the 
descriptive analysis and fixed effects estimations undertaken in this paper confirm that trade 
liberalization indeed has been followed by improved economic performance and a significant increase 
in economic growth compared to a counterfactual that considers other growth determinants. 
Furthermore, this improvement applies to most groups of developing countries. Section 2 briefly   4
reviews the empirical literature of trade liberalization and growth. Section 3 describes the methodology 
used in this paper to assess the impact of trade liberalization on output growth and other relevant 
economic variables. Section 4 presents the data used in this empirical exercise, the sample selected, and 
a description of the main economic patterns of countries in and out of the sample. The statistical 
evaluation of the economic outcome of trade liberalization is undertaken in Section 5. We implement 
the methodology described in Section 3, and test the robustness of its results using different 
specifications and time periods. Section 6 presents conclusions supported by the statistical evidence of 
Section 5. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Attempts to measure the impact of trade policy openness on growth go back several decades, but 
until the early 1990s it simply involved comparisons of GDP growth between opened and closed 
countries, or before and after trade liberalization (see Appendix 1). Classic examples of the pure before 
and after approach (so-called event studies) are two publications by the World Bank (Nash and Thomas, 
1991; and Papageorgiou et al 1991) that identified a year of liberalization and after observing higher 
GDP growth after the reforms, concluded that trade liberalization indeed leads to higher growth. The 
major caveat under this approach is that it does not properly study or control for other factors that could 
have boosted growth after trade liberalization. For instance, it did not account for the fact that many 
countries liberalized trade and at the same time exited a communist regime, ended a political conflict, or 
rebounded from a short-term recession. 
A representative study of the cross-country comparison approach is Balassa (1978), which 
concluded a positive relation between an outward oriented regime and economic growth by observing 
that countries that experience higher exports growth also had a significantly higher GDP growth, even 
after removing exports from GDP accounting. Since exports growth can be fostered by GDP growth 
itself or policies other than trade liberalization, then this observed relation does not demonstrate 
causality from trade policy to growth. An alternative path is taken in the 1987 WDR (World Bank,   5
1987), by providing a subjective measure of the outward orientation of trade policy and observing a 
positive cross-country relation to GDP growth. However, this subjective measure of policy orientation 
has been questioned in RR who shows evident misrepresentations of the trade policy stance in several 
countries under the WDR classification. Furthermore, as was the case with the before and after 
approach, making a cross-country comparison of GDP growth and attributing it to outward orientation, 
implicitly and arguably assumes that other determinants of economic growth are simply white noise. 
The surge of the cross-country growth literature since Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991), 
and Mankiw et al (1992), which takes into account a range of potential determinants of GDP growth, 
gave researchers the opportunity to test the relation between trade openness and growth while properly 
taking into account the effect of other factors of growth. A seminal and most influential paper along this 
research path is Sachs and Warner (1995) (SW). Controlling for several growth factors (e.g. initial 
income, educational attainment, and government consumption) and introducing an index of trade policy 
openness, they replicate Barro (1991) regression on cross-country economic growth. The index of 
openness classifies countries as open or closed based on five criteria of average tariffs, coverage of non-
tariff barriers, exchange rate distortion, export marketing boards, and socialist system of production. 
Their results show that countries classified as open grow, on average, by 2.45 percentage points higher 
than those under a closed trade regime. A number of researchers followed a similar cross-country 
methodology, using the Sachs and Warner index and/or other proxies of trade restrictiveness (e.g. 
Harrison, 1996; Wacziarg, 1998; Greenaway et al, 1998; Edwards, 1998). They overwhelmingly 
concluded that open trade policies lead to higher economic growth. 
The widespread consensus that trade reforms led to faster growth was attacked by Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000), which showed the methodological faults in the five most representative empirical studies 
of the impact of trade openness on growth (Dollar, 1992; Ben-David, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995; 
Edwards, 1998; and Frankel and Romer, 1999). The most defining criticism was on SW paper and its 
trade openness index, noting that the index’s components which most significantly determine its 
positive relation with growth (socialist system, exchange rate distortion, and exports marketing boards),   6
may be capturing the impact of other non trade-related policies. RR argue that the socialist system 
component is clearly associated to many other policies not related to trade, that the exports marketing 
board is notably correlated to a country being located in the stagnant African region, and that the 
exchange rate distortion may be the result of other macroeconomic policies. 
The empirical attempts to capture the effect of trade liberalization on economic growth has since 
then faced the challenge of finding a proxy of trade policy openness that is robust to Rodrik and 
Rodriguez critiques
2. Although Rodrik (2000) proposes using average tariffs to represent trade 
restrictiveness, as argued in Salinas (forthcoming) this indicator completely fails to capture other 
dimensions of trade restrictiveness
3 and is not even a rigorous representation of the restrictiveness of the 
tariff structure. In defense of the SW indicator, Warner (2003) provide evidence that the exchange rate 
distortion component reflects the trade policy stance more than anything else; that only some of the 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa trigger the openness dummy on the basis of the export monopoly 
criterion; and that even after removing the countries that RR claim as misleading there is a positive 
impact on economic growth of having an open trade regime. Despite these arguments, we know that the 
Sachs and Warner indicator is far from an accurate measure of openness, as is based on a subjective 
weighting of imperfect measures of trade restrictiveness such as average tariffs and frequency of non-
tariff barriers. Berg and Krueger (2003) argue that despite some technical deficiencies, the SW indicator 
is a fairly accurate indicator of trade restrictiveness, but such weak assertion obviously does not 
convince the skeptics about any evidence based on this indicator. 
Dollar and Kraay (2004) take a different approach and try to measure the increase in trade policy 
openness (i.e. trade liberalization) by the change in trade flows between two periods in time. However, 
this indicator was promptly and convincingly criticized in Rodrik (2001) essentially for not recognizing 
the endogenous relation between trade flows and GDP growth, as Balassa (1978) failed to do more than 
                                                 
2 Salinas (forthcoming) surveys the different measures of overall trade restrictiveness that have been proposed 
before and after RR and how they are all technically questionable or are not available for enough years and 
countries to be useful in panel regressions.   
3 For instance, Salinas (forthcoming) shows that since the 1980s there has been a low correlation between 
available, cross-country measures of unweighted average tariffs and the frequency of non-tariff barriers.   7
20 years before. Other papers trying to approximate trade policy openness through trade flows (Leamer, 
1998; Hiscox and Kastner, 2002; Bolaky and Freund, 2004) are subject to the same criticism. 
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) (WW) on the other hand, avoid the difficulties involved in measuring 
trade restrictiveness by performing a fixed effects regression based on the prior identification of trade 
liberalization episodes. This methodology was originally applied in SW, and despite the more 
sophisticated econometric technique involved, it is essentially an event study similar to those conducted 
until the early 1990s. Wacziarg and Welch do find an increase in GDP growth after trade liberalization. 
As the before and after studies of decades ago, WW assume that all the acceleration is attributable to 
trade liberalization despite the fact that several of the countries in their sample have simultaneously 
undergone enormous transformations and changes in the external environment. Their sample includes 
countries that have gone through the transition from socialism to the market economy, and countries that 
had conflicts and other non economic upheavals. There are also countries that are dependent on one or 
two highly volatile products and have fluctuations that can not easily be attributed to policy changes. In 
addition, defining years of reform based on the SW criteria leads to several misidentifications of 
liberalization episodes. These deficiencies are described in more detail in the following section, which 
proposes a correction of the before and after methodology as applied in SW and WW and previous 
event studies. 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
The study of the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth is firmly rooted in the empirical 
literature on income convergence (e.g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1991; Mankiw et al, 1992)
4. The 
standard approach assumes a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function: 
1
,, , , , () it it it it it YK H A L
α φα φ −− =
                    ( 1 )  
                                                 
4 Durlauf et al (2004) provide a detailed review of the empirical study of growth economics, including the income 
convergence hypothesis.   8
in which Y is aggregate income, K is physical capital, H is human capital, A is the efficiency level 
of each worker, and L is the size of the labor force, in country i and at time t. Greek letters represent the 
respective shares of each factor in production and constant returns to factors is assumed. Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil (1993) show that under certain assumptions one can test the convergence hypothesis 
through a cross-country regression based on: 
,0 ,, log log log( ) log log
11 1
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where γ is growth of income per capita, g is the growth rate of A (i.e. growth rate of income per 
capita at the steady-state), yi,0 is initial income per capita, sK is the saving rate for physical capital, sH is 
the saving rate for human capital, n is the growth rate of population, δ is the depreciation rate, and εi is a 
residual composed of a random error term and a country-specific shock. Equation (2) assumes that the 
steady-state growth rate (g) is equal across countries, and that the labor force and population grow at the 
same rate. If β is found to be less than zero, then unconditional convergence is implied by the data
5. 
Cross-country growth regressions as in Barro (1991) introduce a vector of control variables, Ci, to 
equation (2) that indirectly allows for heterogeneity in growth rates across countries. 
,0 ,, log log log( ) log log
11 1
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+
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−− −− −−  (3) 
Control variables such as geography, institutional quality, or population size are hence expected to 
have an impact on steady-state growth. Now if β is found to be less than zero this implies that there is 
conditional convergence among sample countries, that is, income per capita convergence conditional on 
control variables. The empirical research of trade liberalization and growth tests whether a measure of 
trade openness is one of these control variables. We can thus reduce equation (3) to: 
,0 log ii i i i yX C T O γ αβ ζ δε =+ + Ψ+ + +        ( 4 )    
                                                 
5 Mankiw et al (1993) find that holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries converge 
at the rate predicted by the augmented Solow model.   9
where TO is an index representing the degree of trade openness of an economy, α is a constant, and Xi 
is composed of log A, log (ni+g+δ), log sK,i and log sH,i. OLS, IV, or GMM are commonly applied over a 
single cross-section of data including averages of each variable for the entire period, or over a panel of 
averages of 5-10 year subperiods. Several variables that have an impact on annual economic growth but 
not on the steady-state rate (e.g. fiscal balance, real exchange rate distortions, natural disasters) are left 
out of the analysis, implicitly and arguably assuming that their fluctuations even out over periods longer 
than 5 years. As mentioned in the previous section, the main obstacle to estimate equation (4) is 
defining an accurate measure of TO. 
An alternative route taken to simplify the above specification and bypass the difficulty of measuring 
TO is to use fixed effects regressions on annual growth data (e.g. SW and WW). Since fixed effects or 
within group estimation transforms the variables in the above equation into deviations from the mean, 
those growth factors that are time invariant are dropped out from the equation. Geography is clearly a 
time invariant factor, while the overall institutional quality changes only gradually. Factors that generate 
fluctuations of annual growth around its steady-state are again assumed to even out over the periods 
under observation. Given these considerations the specification used for the fixed effects exercise is 
simply: 
,, , it it it POSTLIB γ απ μ =+ +
          (5) 
in which the subindex t represents time, and POSTLIB is a dummy variable equal to zero in the 
years prior to trade liberalization, and one afterwards. Thus, π measures the increase in GDP per capita 
growth attributed to trade reforms. 
The present paper takes into account two important violations in SW and WW to the assumptions 
needed for the validity of their fixed effects estimations of π: incorrect identification of liberalization 
episodes and changes in omitted variables. In general, we address these issues through a new 
identification of trade liberalization episodes based on reviews conducted under the World Bank’s Trade 
Assistance Evaluation (IEG, 2006); a sample selection that eliminates cases of extreme volatility in the   10
dependent variable; and fixed effects estimates of the following multivariate specification of Equation 
(5): 
,, , 1 , , , , log it it it it it it it POSTLIB y X C γ απ β ζ ω μ − =+ + + Ψ + + Ω +
     (6) 
in which we reintroduce determinants of growth dropped from equation (4), and add a vector of 
control variables ωι,τ that impact growth, but not its steady-state rate. 
Along these lines we take several steps to ensure the validity of our estimates. First, to properly 
determine POSTLIB we need to ensure the correct identification of one trade liberalization episode per 
country. A major consideration here though is that most countries have undergone more than one 
liberalization program; some of them were reversed. For an event study it is obvious that reversed 
reforms should be excluded. The SW methodology, used also in WW, selects as year of reform the one 
in which the trade regime first meets its five well known criteria without any consecutive reversal. 
Although classifying countries as open or closed to trade based on the SW criteria makes sense in cross-
country regressions, its application for fixed effects estimations is not optimal. Growth may have 
increased years before the SW criteria was met as a result of earlier reforms, and such acceleration 
would be considered part of the pre liberalization years. Most importantly, under these criteria, several 
countries that undertook strong trade liberalization (e.g. China, Croatia, India) are wrongly considered 
unreformed. 
The exact timing of the major trade reform would always be debatable, but for most countries there 
is a consensus by economists with some knowledge of the countries in question. In others, the dates are 
rather close. Only in few cases, the years do vary by a large margin. Our list of liberalization episodes is 
taken from the World Bank’s Trade Assistance Evaluation (IEG, 2006) used also in Jinjarak et al 
(forthcoming). It includes the most significant trade reform of each country, as determined through a   11
review of several literature sources
6. The list of these episodes is presented in Appendix 3, together with 
the list used in WW. 
Second, we note that although dropped from fixed effects estimates in SW and WW, income per 
capita does change over time and in many countries it multiplied significantly in a period of 20 years 
(e.g. East Asian countries). If, for instance, a country has significantly narrowed its income gap with 
respect to developed nations and unconditional convergence holds, then the exclusion of this variable 
would lead to a downward bias in the estimation of POSTLIB. We thus include the logarithm of income 
per capita of each country relative to the one in the U.S. for each year throughout our period of 
estimation (one-year lagged). The inclusion of this variable also should take into account the evolution 
of other determinants that are endogeneous to GDP per capita (institutional quality, human capital, and 
life expectancy) and thus evolve in parallel with the latter.  
Third, we consider growth determinants suggested by the Solow growth model (X-variables in 
Equation (6)). Investment in human capital is usually approximated in growth regressions through the 
school enrollment rates. But although conventional wisdom and micro studies suggest a positive effect 
of education on economic growth, cross-country growth econometrics using enrollment has not 
confirmed this hypothesis. Several reasons have been proposed for this apparent contradiction (Pritchett, 
1996; and Krueger and Lindahl, 2002). Recognizing these obstacles and the fact that investment in 
human capital generally has followed an upward trend in recent decades, we approximate its impact on 
growth by including year dummies or a time trend in our fixed effects estimates. 
It is similarly complicated to control for the impact of changes in physical capital investment on 
growth. Because trade liberalization is expected to boost investment, this variable is usually considered 
as an outcome variable in empirical analysis. Thus, including it in the multivariate specification of 
Equation (2) would generate endogeneity in our estimates. If we exclude this variable, then our 
estimates of the coefficient of POSTLIB would be biased upwards (downwards) only if this omitted 
                                                 
6 Such sources include World Bank and IMF country documents, WTO Trade Policy Reviews, and country reports 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit.   12
variable systematically increases (decreases) after reforms in our sample, and this increase (decrease) is 
prompted by a factor other than trade reform (e.g. savings policy, foreign direct investment policy). The 
only reason we think this could systematically be the case is if simultaneous structural adjustment 
reforms lead to higher investment. Nevertheless, we observe in Section 5 that there is only a mild 
increase in investment before and after trade liberalization, and therefore it cannot significantly explain 
an increase in output growth after reforms. We thus exclude this variable from most regressions, but 
include the investment share of output (two-years lagged) in one of our specifications to test for the 
robustness of our results. 
Fourth, we observe that several variables in C, although assumed to vary only gradually, may have 
changed significantly over the period under our scrutiny
7. Geography is constant but other factors listed 
in Appendix 2, are clearly not. Institutions can change over time and indeed, one vast and systematic 
institutional reform occurred during the period under consideration in this paper: transition from 
communism. This move launched a radical transformation from state-led to market institutions. The 
transition from communism is such a cataclysmic event, that we opt to remove transition economies 
from the sample. 
8 
9 
Another control variable commonly included in growth regressions is population size, which we 
include in our regression in an instrumented form (two-year lagged) to avoid endogeneity with respect 
                                                 
7 The control variables considered in this study is taken from a list from Bosworth and Collins (2003), which 
includes those most commonly used in the empirical growth literature. See Appendix 2. 
8 A similar but less dramatic event is the implementation of structural adjustment reforms. Given that basically all 
developing countries have undertaken trade liberalization as part of structural adjustment programs, we maintain 
structural adjusters in the sample (see footnote 5). These reforms (exchange rate reform, fiscal adjustment, 
privatization of imports and exports companies, openness to foreign capital, etc) are complementary to trade 
liberalization. Thus, as in Baldwin (2003), our conclusions talk about the impact of trade liberalization defined in a 
broader sense: the dismantling of ISI and switch to outward orientation. 
9 Wacziarg and Welch (2003) attempt to separate the effect of trade reform from the impact of other 
complementary policies embedded in structural adjustment reforms by estimating their results after removing from 
the sample those countries that implemented trade liberalization together with a comprehensive privatization 
program. There are three main caveats in their approach as some of the pure reformers: (i) did undertake 
privatization few years before or after the trade liberalization episode, thus also significantly affecting growth rates 
after trade liberalization (Kenya); (ii) implemented significant privatization though considerable state involvement 
in the economy remains (India and Morocco); or (iii) implemented other non-privatization reforms (e.g. 
deregulation, sectoral reforms, fiscal adjustment, etc) that could equally alter potential growth by stabilizing an 
economy or fostering the development of market institutions (e.g. Bolivia, Ghana, Kenya). Taking these caveats 
into consideration, their sample of pure trade reformers would be reduced to only 3 countries.   13
to the dependent variable. As was the case with saving in human capital we expect other control 
variables such as life expectancy to show a positive trend through time and hence, aim to capture their 
impact by including either year dummies or a time trend
10. To further limit the effect of other possibly 
omitted variables that could gradually change over time, our estimations only consider the twelve years 
before and nine after the reforms
11. 
Fifth, we consider several variables that affect growth around its stead-state rate (ω variables in 
Equation 6). We include inflation growth, terms of trade, and fiscal balance following Bosworth and 
Collins (2003), to which we add other significant determinants of GDP growth: occurrence of a natural 
disaster; deviation of the real exchange rate from its long term equilibrium level; current account 
balance (reflecting the effect of capital inflows); and growth of world demand (see Appendix 2). The 
effect of the latter variable on growth is approximated through the inclusion of year dummies. Although 
some of these variables are expected to be cyclical, there are still significant long term trends which 
imply that they may have considerably different averages before and after trade liberalization. In 
Section 4, we verify that indeed most of these variables are more recessionary in the period after relative 
to the period before trade liberalization. This means that the impact of trade reforms on growth is more 
positive than the coefficient of the trade liberalization dummy portrays when estimating equation (5).  
Sixth, we perform sample modifications to reduce other sources of volatility in our dependent 
variable. Thus, we remove countries with characteristics that exacerbate such volatility: those with 
considerable oil dependence (fuel exports accounting for more than 50% of merchandise exports) and a 
small size of its population (below 1 million people)
 12. Economic performance in such countries is 
                                                 
10 Wacziarg and Welch (2003) also include a time trend and year dummies in their analysis. 
11 Limiting the period before trade liberalization to 12 years prior to reform possibly leaves out some years of high 
growth under the ISI model (e.g. Brazil, Argentina) and one could argue that this could bias our estimates in favor 
of the post-liberalization period. On the other hand, note in the following paragraph that we also opt to eliminate 
from our sample the recessionary period prior to reform [-4,-1] and one could argue that this could bias our 
estimates against the post-liberalization years.  
12 Appendix 5 presents a classification of developing countries according to several characteristics, including 
those used to define our sample of countries.   14
excessively dependent on the evolution of oil prices and external shocks, respectively
13. To avoid 
variation due to changes in the sample throughout time we include only countries with GDP data for all 
years in the [-12,9] period. We also exclude countries that have gone through serious conflicts as a large 
literature documents their pernicious impact on economic growth.
14 The determination of this sample is 
in line with the methodology applied in Jinjarak et al (forthcoming)
15.  
Finally, we delete the years of economic crisis that surrounded trade reforms, as we observe later 
that in average our sample countries experience a period of economic downturn four years before 
reform and a rebound in the following year. Such exclusion is particularly needed for the countries that 
experienced hyperinflation. 
Our sample selection technique also permits a more accurate application of within country 
estimation of the impact of trade liberalization on other economic indicators, such as investment, 
exports, share of manufacturing exports, industry value added, and exports concentration. These 
indicators will allow us to obtain a comprehensive picture of the impact of trade liberalization on 
economic performance. 
The regressions on GDP growth are estimated using the entire sample of 39 countries and also for 
subgroups of countries grouped by world region, income per capita, and size of the population. We 
consider non reversed trade liberalization episodes between the years 1970 to 2004 and for each country 
we analyze economic performance 12 years before to 9 years after trade reforms, excluding the crisis 
years [–4,1]. 
                                                 
13 A valid critique to our methodology in this regard is that several other countries that remain in our sample are 
highly dependent on a handful of non-oil commodities and thus could be highly volatile. Yet, we cannot exclude 
such countries due to sample size considerations and expect that the inclusion of terms of trade would control for 
volatility in commodity prices. 
14 Collier and Hoeffler (1998). We define conflict countries as those that experienced war (internal or external) 
according to Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
15 The obvious caveat of concentrating on this sample is its reduced size. Whereas SW and WW use more than 
100 countries in their analysis we are left with only 39.   15
4.  DATA 
4.1.  Data Sources 
As shown in Appendix 4, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005) is 
the source for most variables in our analysis. The main dependent variable, GDP per capita growth 
(GDPPCG), is the annual real change in gross domestic product (in local currency) minus annual 
population growth, both indicators extracted from World Bank (2005). Other dependent variables are 
also obtained from this source are gross capital formation as a share of GDP (IGDP), the share of 
exports of goods and services in total GDP (XGDP), the share of manufacturing exports in total 
merchandise exports (MANX), and industrial valued added as a share of GDP (IND). UNCTAD’s 
Handbook of Statistics (UNCTAD, 2006) is our source for our measure of exports concentration (which 
is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). Among our independent variables, World Bank (2005) is 
the source of total population and our estimate of GNI per capita relative to the one of the United States. 
It is also the source of our measure of terms of trade, current account balance, fiscal balance, and 
inflation. Our list of natural disasters comes from the OFDA/CRED Emergency database (EM-DAT, 
2006) and we use estimates of real exchange rate misalignments (RXRDEV) from Elbadawi and Soto 
(forthcoming). In addition to regression variables, we use other statistics to compare the general 
economic status and evolution of countries in and out of the sample, and before and after trade 
liberalization.  These statistics are all listed and described in Appendix 4. 
4.2.  Data Description 
Developing countries included in our sample did not differ considerably or systematically from 
those left out during the period under consideration (1970-2004). According to the average values 
presented in Appendix 6, countries in the sample had higher output growth, but lower income per capita 
and lower level of industrialization. The general macroeconomic outlook is slightly better for in-sample 
countries having lower inflation, debt to GDP share, current account deficits, and fiscal deficits. On the   16
other hand, countries in the sample were also slightly less open to trade in terms of their share of exports 
and imports to GDP, but had similarly restrictive trade barriers than other developing countries. In-
sample countries also had lower concentration of exports and a larger share of manufacture to 
merchandise exports. Appendix 7 presents average statistics for these variables in out-of-sample 
countries grouped according to the factor behind their exclusion (i.e. conflict, transition, population, and 
oil dependence). 
The list of trade liberalization episodes in our paper fairly differs from the one used in WW (see 
Appendix 3). Out of the 39 countries included in the sample, there are 25 countries (67%) in which our 
identified liberalization year coincides with the one in WW. Out of the 14 countries of disagreement, 
there are no countries in which the divergence is less than three years. In six cases we identify a year of 
liberalization that precedes the one identified in WW, since our list includes the initiation of the 
liberalization process whereas WW use a following year in which SW criteria is first met. In the other 8 
of our identified reforms (Central African Republic, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Malawi, South Korea, 
Senegal, and Thailand), WW did not recognize a year of reform as these countries have either 
permanently met or unmet the SW criteria throughout the period 1970-2004
16. 
5.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1. Basic Statistics 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average growth of GDP per capita 12 years before and 9 years 
after the identified reforms for our sample of countries. There are three markedly different periods of 
growth: a first one that corresponds to the years of stable growth (years [-12, -5]) under an ISI regime; a 
second period (years [-4,1]) of economic crisis prior to trade liberalization and a rebound right after the 
reforms; and the years of stable growth that follow the reforms (years [2,9]). Thus, in comparing 
economic performance before and after trade liberalization, we delete the period of crisis that surrounds 
                                                 
16 In the case of Chile we do not consider the liberalization started in the 1970s (as SW and WW do), since it was 
significantly reversed in the early 1980s.   17
reforms, since not doing this lowers our estimates of pre-reform performance. One can argue that that 
the performance of the ISI period should be judged considering both its years of stable growth and those 
of economic crisis that come as a result of the distortions it created. However, we prefer to apply a most 
stringent test on the benefits of reform and present much of our analysis removing the years of turmoil 
in which the ISI model derailed
17. 
 

































Liberalization in our sample countries was followed in average by growth increase of more than 1 
percent vis-à-vis the period of stable growth under ISI
18. Actually if we do not remove crisis years from 
our comparison the increase in GDP per capita growth is from 0.38 in years [-12, -1] to 2.03 percent in 
years [0,9]; or an increase of 1.6 percent. Appendix 8 confirms that there is an acceleration in all 
country subgroups classified according to geographic region, population size and income per capita. 
Appendix 10 in turn shows that growth increased in the large majority of our sample countries (31 out 
of 39, or 80 percent of them). 
                                                 
17 Since our sample includes those countries for which we have GDP growth data for all years within the [-12,9] period, 
Figure 1 and other tables in this section are not distorted by a time-varying country sample. 
18 Year -12 is preceded by two years of growth below 1 percent and Year 9 is followed by an average growth around 2 
percent.   18
Table 1: Economic Indicators Before and After Trade Liberalization in 
Sample Countries: 1975-2004 






        
    
General Indicators    
Gross National Income Per Capita (US$, Atlas Method)  981.37 1624.45 
Inflation (% annual)  29.39 25.91 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)  -4.43 -1.86 
Growth in External Debt (% Annual)  10.42 -1.54 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)  -5.69 -3.39 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (2000=100)  152.84 102.35 
Terms of Trade (2000=100)  115.45 103.05 
Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  29.42 35.01 
Regression Variables    
Growth in GDP per Capita (% Annual)  0.92 2.11 
Investment (% of GDP)  20.41 21.22 
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  23.88 29.53 
Industrial Value Added (% of GDP)  27.54 26.67 
Exports Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index)  0.36 0.31 
Manufacturing Exports (% of Merchandise Exports)  26.16 41.60 
        
Source: World Development Indicators (2006)    
 
Table 1 and Appendix 9 in turn give a more comprehensive picture of the economic evolution 
before and after trade liberalization. Average growth in GDP per capita increases from 0.92 to 2.11 
between the periods [-12,-5] to [2,9]. This acceleration is most impressive if we consider that 
macroeconomic variables were clearly more expansionary in the years before trade liberalization. State 
dirigisme prior to reform translated into high growth in the external debt and unsustainably high levels 
of current account deficits. The period after reform in turn is characterized by reduction in the levels of 
debt to GDP and considerably lower current account deficits. Furthermore, terms of trade were higher 
before trade liberalization than afterwards. Table 1 shows that trade liberalization was also followed by 
considerable increases in investment, exports share of GDP, share of manufacturing exports, with only a 
minor reduction in industry value added and even a reduction in exports concentration. This is later 
confirmed through fixed effects estimates. 
   19
























































An interesting development complementary to trade liberalization is the evolution of the real 
exchange rate in the years around economic reform. Theoretically it is clear that a reduction in imports 
barriers needs to be accompanied by a real exchange rate devaluation to maintain external equilibrium. 
Trade reforms increase the demand for imports and therefore the demand and price of foreign exchange. 
Thus, the real exchange rate should fall after trade liberalization to avoid misalignment. Figure 2, shows 
that in average in our sample the real exchange rate depreciated in the years preceding reform. The real 
exchange rate falls by about 25 percent in the 6 years prior to trade liberalization
19, and in the years after 
trade reforms there is only a mild, temporary appreciation. However, an index of real exchange rate 
misalignment presented in Elbadawi and Soto (forthcoming) shows that the real exchange rate first falls 
slightly below its equilibrium value, but that afterwards it increases to 10 percent above equilibrium.  
                                                 
19 In fact, as shown in Table 1, the actual fall in the real exchange rate from period [-12,-5] to [2,9] is of about one 
third.   20
5.2. Fixed Effects Results 
The within groups estimations under all specifications show a positive and statistically significant 
association between trade liberalization and GDP growth. The first column in table 2 includes the entire 
period from 12 years before to 9 years after the reform under the basic specification of equation (5). The 
apparent impact of trade opening is an increase in income per capita growth of 1.7 percent, a 
considerable acceleration with high statistical significance. As expected, this impact is lower when the 
years of crisis [-4,1] are excluded but it is still above 1 percent p.a. and statistically significant at 1%. 
Table 2: Trade Liberalization and GDP Per Capita Growth      
   Excluding [-4,1] 
Basic Equation 
Using Entire 










  Independent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth 
postlib 1.686 1.23 2.096 3.571 1.049  0.993
   (6.10)** (4.16)** (3.49)** (3.66)** (2.91)** (2.47)*
trend     -0.105        
       (1.65)       
Constant 0.356 0.926 0.584 0.737 0.926  0.993
   (1.92) (4.32)** (1.96) (0.27) (4.16)** (4.11)**
Observations 856 661 661 661 505  427
Number of countries  39 39 39 39 39  39
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.02
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         
 
We noted earlier though that the coefficient of POSTLIB in the basic specification of equation (5) 
will underestimate the impact of trade liberalization, if the expansionary macroeconomic policies and 
economic context in the pre-liberalization years are taken into account. Equation (5) is reestimated 
adding a time trend and year dummies. These variables should capture the impact of the negative trend 
in the macroeconomic and external context. The third column of Table 2 shows that the time trend has a 
negative coefficient, although it is not statistically significant. Inserting a time trend has the effect of 
increasing the coefficient to above 2 percent while using year dummies raises it to almost 4 percent.   21
Because in most sample countries there was a recessionary period prior to trade liberalization one 
could argue that the acceleration after reforms is actually the result of a rebound effect. In fact, Figure 1 
shows that there is a spike in average growth in years 1 through 4 after reforms. Yet, the last two 
columns in Table 2 show that there was a significant increase in growth after reforms even when we do 
not include 4 and 5 years before and after the reforms. There is indeed a slight reduction in the 
coefficient of POSTLIB, but still above 1 percent and with statistical significance above 5 percent.
20 
We take one step further to capture other factors that may have affected growth before and after 
trade liberalization and in Table 3 present the results of fixed effects estimations with  multivariate 
specifications including growth determinants that are omitted under the standard specification of 
equation (5)
21.The first column shows the estimates under the basic specification. In the second column 
we introduce one lag of the dependent variable (l.gdppcg)
22, population size (ll.lpop) and the gap with 
respect to U.S. income (gdptous). The specification in the third column adds interaction terms to take 
into account the possibility that the magnitude of the acceleration after trade liberalization depends on 
population size (postpops) or the average growth rate in the pre-reform period (postini). The next three 
columns introduce variables that are relatively exogenous to GDP growth (i.e., real exchange rate 
deviation (rxrdev)
23, natural disasters (disast), and terms of trade (ltot)). In the next two columns we add 
variables that are rather endogenous to growth (i.e. current account balance (cur), inflation growth 
(infg), and fiscal balance (fbal). The last column introduces an instrument for investment (ll.igdp). 
                                                 
20 The reduction in statistical significance could partly be the result of the lower number of observations we have 
after removing several years after reform. Ideally, we could have compensated the loss in observations by 
including more years after reform and thus compare growth between periods [-12,-5] and [5,12]. However, this 
would imply a significant reduction in the number of countries in our sample, since about one fourth of them do 
not have growth data for the period [10,12]. 
21 Notice than in this estimation we reintroduce the period [-4,1] to increase the number of observations given that 
that there is missing data for some of the independent variables. Since the deletion of period [-4,1] caused a 
reduction of 0.5 percent in the coefficient of POSTLIB, we can assume that this reduction similarly applies to our 
estimates in Table 3. 
22 Although potential endogeneity may result from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, this dynamic 
specification can be estimated through fixed effects because the time dimension of our panel exceeds 15 
observations. 
23 Here we use the real exchange rate misalignment estimates created by Elbadawi and Soto (2006). Although GDP 
growth does have an impact on the real exchange rate, the estimates of misalignment by Elbadawi and Soto properly 
control for this effect.   22
Although this is a rather simplistic specification of the relationships between the independent 
variables and growth, most of the resulting estimates have statistical significance; the signs of the 
coefficients are as expected a priori; and their magnitudes are reasonable. The sign and statistical 
significance of β implies that there is conditional income convergence and the magnitude of this 
coefficient is in line with conventional estimates in the growth convergence literature. Output growth is 
increased by improvements in terms of trade and inflation reduction, while it is lowered when a disaster 
occurs or when the real exchange rate is over-appreciated. This latter negative relation between a real 
exchange rate above equilibrium and economic growth is highly significant and consistent across all 
specifications
24. In agreement with several other empirical studies (e.g. Aron and Meullbauer, 2001; 
Bosworth and Collins, 2003), we observe a positive relation between the fiscal balance and GDP 
growth. And also as expected, the sign and significance of the coefficient of postpops implies that the 
acceleration after trade liberalization is higher in smaller countries. 
Most importantly, the inclusion of all these variables has a robust impact on the coefficient of trade 
liberalization. Since most of these variables were more favorable in the years prior to trade reforms, 
including them through a multivariate specification results in a considerable increase in the coefficient 
and t-statistic of POSTLIB dummy with respect to the basic specification. Under all specifications trade 
liberalization is now associated with an increase in output growth of between 1.73 and 2.59 percent per 
year. These estimates are slightly higher than our approximations in Table 2, when we only use a time 
trend to capture omitted variables, and have also higher statistical significance as measured by t-
                                                 
24 This empirical finding supports several studies including IEG (2006) that point out at the importance of 
maintaining a competitive real exchange rate during trade liberalization.   23
statistics
25. Furthermore, as seen in appendix 12, the increase in the coefficient of POSTLIB is robust to 
the introduction of lags of several independent variables
26. 
Table 3: Trade Liberalization and GDP Per Capita Growth Controlling for Other Growth Factors
1 
   Independent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth 
postlib 1.686 2.327 2.392 1.996 1.737 2.116 2.592 2.504
   (6.10)** (4.05)** (3.98)** (3.21)** (2.55)* (2.92)** (3.54)** (3.43)**
l.gdppcg   0.141 0.138 0.117 0.167 0.244 0.222 0.225
     (4.00)** (3.90)** (3.05)** (3.90)** (5.32)** (4.84)** (4.93)**
ll.lpop   -16.206 -17.326 -18.37 -16.658 -18.345 -16.518 -16.302
     (3.85)** (4.05)** (3.81)** (3.24)** (3.47)** (3.13)** (3.10)**
gdptous   -4.091 -4.188 -4.708 -4.025 -4.707 -4.895 -4.592
     (5.43)** (5.31)** (5.36)** (4.21)** (4.70)** (4.74)** (4.42)**
postpops     -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
       (1.74) (2.34)* (2.56)* (2.75)** (3.08)** (3.10)**
postini     0.049 0.037 0.074 -0.04 -0.022 -0.012
       (0.40) (0.29) (0.50) (0.25) (0.14) (0.08)
rxrdev      -0.016 -0.017 -0.02 -0.021 -0.023
        (2.88)** (2.94)** (3.17)** (3.33)** (3.54)**
disast      -0.939 -0.947 -0.482 -0.487 -0.522
        (2.22)* (2.12)* (0.97) (1.00) (1.07)
ltot       1.017 0.959 2.257 2.099
         (0.87) (0.67) (1.56) (1.45)
infg       -0.452 -0.649 -0.632 -0.651
         (2.39)* (3.07)** (3.02)** (3.11)**
fbal        0.182 0.173 0.179
          (3.42)** (3.29)** (3.43)**
cur         -0.211 -0.211
           ( 3 . 8 4 ) * * ( 3 . 8 3 ) * *
ll.igdp          -0.075
            ( 1 . 6 2 )
Constant 0.356 251.254 269.08 284.199 257.072 292.922 250.054 254.725
   (1.92) (3.77)** (3.97)** (3.71)** (3.10)** (3.28)** (2.89)** (2.87)**
Observations 856 764 764 665 549 454 450 449
Number of countries  39 39 39 37 34 30 30 30
R-squared 0.04 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.35 0.35
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses        
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%        
1Year dummies are included (except in the first regression) though their coefficients are not shown in this table 
 
                                                 
25 Unfortunately we cannot make a direct comparison between our results and those in WW because the latter are 
calculated for subperiods that do not coincide with our periods of estimation. Appendix 11 however presents 
estimates using our methodology and WW identification of reform episodes. There is indeed some divergence 
between the estimates in Table 2 and Appendix 11; a difference ranging between 0.06 and 1 percent. 
26 In appendix 12 we introduce lags of time-varying independent variables that were statistically significant in 
Table 3. Since the introduction of lags brings a reduction in the number of observations, the coefficients of several 
variables lose statistical significance.    24
It is still frequently claimed that any potential benefits of trade liberalization on overall growth 
come at the cost of an increased economic vulnerability to external shocks as a result of 
deindustrialization and concentration of exports in a few products. Table 4 shows that such claims are 
not supported by cross-country evidence. Trade reforms have been followed by only a very small 
decrease in industry valued added (on average of less than 1 percent of GDP) and in fact reforms were 
followed in average by a considerable decrease of 0.06 points in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 
exports concentration. The move towards trade liberalization has been followed also by an 
industrialization of exports: an increase of 18 percentage points in the share of manufacturing exports in 
total merchandise exports
27. 
Table 4: Impact of Trade Liberalization on Other Economic Variables in the 















postlib 5.472  0.768 -0.839 -0.06 17.867 
   (11.44)**  (2.27)* (2.68)** (6.20)** (18.96)** 
Constant 23.972  20.443 27.522 0.364 24.872 
   (70.81)**  (85.45)** (124.35)** (46.97)** (36.82)** 
Observations 623  623 607 370 543 
Number of 
countries 39  39 38 38 39 
R-squared 0.18  0.01 0.01 0.1 0.42 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     















                                                 
27 We do not present any results about the impact of trade liberalization on social indicators given the lack of such data 
for the period prior to the reforms.   25














































































































5.3. Sources of Heterogeneity 
As was shown in Appendix 10, there is large heterogeneity by country in the evolution of GDP per 
capita growth before and after trade liberalization. Appendix 13 investigates the sources of such 
variation by estimating equation (5) for different country subgroups. We find that some of this 
heterogeneity is explained by country characteristics that are expected to influence the effect of 
liberalization. For instance, the growth increase following trade reforms is more significant in small 
developing countries which because of their reduced internal market, are expected to suffer more from   26
the economic isolation imposed by ISI policies. Interestingly, low income countries experience a similar 
increase in growth following trade liberalization as middle income countries. Since there is a positive 
relation between the quality of institutions and income per capita, this implies that supply response from 
trade opening was not limited by weak institutions. Furthermore, countering frequent criticisms, the 
evidence in this Appendix shows that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have indeed benefited 
significantly from an outward orientation of economic policies
28 
29. Finally, we divide the sample 
according to pace of the trade reforms, either fast or gradual, based on a classification established at 
Jinjarak et al (forthcoming), and we observe that gradual reformers obtain more robust benefits than fast 
liberalizers. 





























































































































































































































































































































                                                 
28 These patterns are robust to the inclusion of a time trend. 
29 We cannot make strong inferences about MNA and SAR due to the small number of countries in our sample.   27
6.  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
By appropriately using within-country estimation, which circumvents the need to measure trade 
openness, this paper finds that trade liberalization has been followed by a significant increase in GDP 
per capita growth for a sample of developing countries that are not in transition from socialism, do not 
have conflicts, and do not depend on a single natural resource. The estimated average increase in growth 
varies between 1.2 and 2.6 percent according to which specification we use to take into account the 
evolution of other growth determinants and is statistically significant under all specifications. Since our 
methodology controls for many other factors that could have prompted growth variation after trade 
liberalization, the evidence suggest that it was the move towards an outward oriented regime (i.e. trade 
liberalization as defined in Baldwin (2003)) that fostered output per capita growth in our sample 
countries. For other factors to have caused this acceleration, they would have to be systematically 
correlated to POSTLIB. Thus far, our results are robust to the inclusion of previously omitted variables. 
This increase in output per capita growth has been most significant in small countries, and contrary 
to common claims, it has been substantial irrespective of income per capita level and considerably 
important in Sub-Saharan African countries. Despite the claims of skeptics, growth has increased 
substantially after the dismantling of the ISI regime in Latin American countries. Also disproving usual 
criticisms, trade liberalization has not significantly changed the level of industrialization of an economy, 
and has actually been followed by lower export concentration and a higher share of manufacturing 
exports. Interestingly, our multivariate fixed effects estimates suggest that the overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate was an important factor limiting the supply response to trade reform. 
In the midst of international negotiations for trade liberalization at the multilateral, bilateral, and 
regional levels, it is necessary to put into perspective cross-country evidence about the potential impact 
of trade openness on economic development
30. If the dismantling of the ISI model has indeed increased 
GDP per capita growth by around 2 percentage points as our evidence suggests, then its most 
                                                 
30 Note though that the evidence in this paper mainly reflects the impact of unilateral trade liberalization and that more benefits to 
developing countries are expected from reciprocal liberalization schemes.   28
enthusiastic proponents should recognize that trade reform by itself cannot generate the per capita 
growth levels of the so-called East Asian Miracle Economies of near 6 percent per year.  
However, the economic acceleration that has followed trade liberalization shows that reforms did 
not bring doomsday for liberalizing countries and that the evidence actually suggests that trade reforms 
did make a very important contribution to sustained economic development across developing countries. 





   29
 
REFERENCES 
Aron, Janine. and Muellbauer, John. 2001. “Interest Rate Effects on Output: Evidence from a GDP 
forecasting Model for South Africa” Paper prepared for the 2
nd Annual Research Conference , IMF, 29-
30 November, 2001. 
 
Balassa, Bela. 1978. “Exports and Economic Growth: Further Evidence.” Journal of Development 
Economics E, 5, 181-189. 
 
Baldwin, Robert. 2003. Openness and Growth: What's the Empirical Relationship? Robert E. Baldwin. 
NBER Working Paper No. 9578 
 
Barro, Robert J, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 407-43, May 
 
Barro, Robert J & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992. "Convergence," Journal of Political Economy, University of 
Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 223-51, April. 
 
Ben-David, Dan. 1993. “Equalizing Exchange: Trade Liberalization and Income Convergence,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 108(3). 
 
Berg, Andrew and Krueger, Anne O., "Trade, Growth, and Poverty: A Selective Survey" (February 2003). 
IMF Working Paper No. 03/30 
 
Bolaky, Bineswaree, and Freund, Caroline.  2004.  “Trade, Regulations, and Growth.”  Policy Research 
Working Paper No. WPS3255.  Washington, D.C.:  The World Bank. 
 
Bosworth, Barry and Collins, Susan, 2003 "The Empirics of Growth: An Update" Brookings Papers of 
Economic Activity (September 2003). Washington, DC. 
 
Calderon, Cesar; Loayza, Norman; and Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus.  2004. “Openness, Vulnerability, and 
Growth.” World Bank Research Paper, First Draft. 
 
Chang, Roberto; Kaltani, Linda; and Loayza, Norman. 2005. ‘‘Openness can be good for Growth: The 
Role of Policy Complementarities.’’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper # 3763. 
 
Cline, William. 2004. “Trade Policy and Global Poverty.” International Institute of Economics, Washington, 
DC 
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, 1998. ‘On economic causes of civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 50 
(4), pp. 563–573, 1998. 
 
Dollar, David.  1992.  “Outward-oriented Developing Countries Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence 
from 95 LDC’s, 1976-85.”  In Economic Development and Cultural Change 40(April): 523–544. 
 
Dollar, David. and Kraay, Art. 2004. “Trade, Growth, and Poverty.” Economic Journal 114(493): F22-49. 
 
Durlauf, Steven N; Johnson, Paul; and Temple, Johnathan R. W., 2004. "Growth Econometrics," Vassar 
College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 61, Vassar College Department of Economics. 
   30
Edwards, Sebastian.  1998.  “Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?” Economic 
Journal 108(447): 383–98. 
 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Soto, Raimundo .  forthcoming.  “Theory and Empirics of Real Exchange Rates in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Countries”. mimeo 
 
EM-DAT (2006): The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database - www.em-dat.net - Université 
Catholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey Alexander, and Romer, David.  1999.  “Does Trade Cause Growth?” American Economic 
Review  89(3): 379–99. 
 
Feenstra Robert., 2004, Advanced International Trade, Theory and Evidence, Princeton Univ. Press, ISBN 0-
691-11410-2 
 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Wallensteen, Peter; Eriksson, Mikael; Sollenberg, Margareta; and Strand, Havard, 
2002. ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637. 
 
Greenaway, David; Morgan, Wyn; and Wright, Peter. 1998. “Trade liberalisation and growth in developing 
countries.” Journal of Development Economics 67: 229-244. 
 
Harrison, Ann. 1996. “Openness and Growth: A Time Series, Cross-Country Analysis for Developing 
Countries". Journal of Development Economics. No. 48: 419-447. 
 
Hiscox, Michael, and Kastner, Scott. 2002.  “A General Measure of Trade Policy Orientations: Gravity-
Model-Based Estimates for 82 Nations, 1960-1992.”. Draft available at: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/HiscoxKastner.pdf 
 
Independent Evaluation Group, 2006. Assessing World Bank Support for Trade, 1987-2004: An IEG 
Evaluation. Washington, DC: The World Bank 
 
Krueger, Alan, and Lindahl, Mikael, 2001. “Education for Growth: Why And For Whom?” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. XXXIX (December 2001) pp. 1101–1136 
 
Leamer, Edward. 1988. Measures of Openness. In Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. R. Baldwin 
(ed). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Jinjarak, Yothin; Salinas, Gonzalo; and Tsikata, Ivonne. forthcoming. " Trade Adjustment Lending: Is the 
Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty?" mimeo. 
 
Mankiw, N Gregory, Romer, David; and Weil, David N, 1992. "A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic 
Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 407-37, May 
 
Muellbauer, John. and Nunziata, Luca. 2001. “Credit, the Stock Market and Oil: forecasting US GDP.” 
CEPR discussion paper no. 2906, August. 
 
Nash, John and Thomas, Vinod. “Reform of trade policy: recent evidence from theory and practice.” The 
World Bank Research Observer, vol. 6, no. 2 (July 1991), pp. 219-240 
 
Papageorgiou, Demetris; Michaely, Michael; and Choksi, Armeane, eds., 1991, Liberalizing Foreign Trade 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
   31
Pritchett, Lant, 1996, "Where Has All the Education Gone?". World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 1581. 
 
Rodrik, Dani.  2000.  “Comments on "Trade, Growth, and Poverty," by D. Dollar and A. Kraay (October 
2000).” Electronic version available at: 
<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/papers.html>. 
 
Rodriguez, Francisco, and Rodrik, Dani.  2000.  “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to 
the Cross-National Evidence.” In Ben Bernanke and Kenneth S. Rogoff (eds.) NBER Macroeconomic 
Annual.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press. 
 
Rodrik, Dani; Subramanian, Arvind; and Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 
3643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Warner, Andrew.  1995.  “Economic Convergence and Economic Policies.” In 
William Brainard and George Perry (eds.) Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 1: 108–118. 
 
Salinas, Gonzalo.  Forthcoming.  “Measuring the Effectiveness of Trade Liberalization.” mimeo. 
 
Santos-Paulino, Amelia U. and Thirlwall, A. P. 2004. "Trade Liberalisation and Economic Performance in 
Developing Countries – Introduction" . Economic Journal, Vol. 114, pp. F1-F3, February. 
 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and Development). 2006. Handbook of Statistics On-line. 
Available at: < http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/> 
 
Wacziarg, Romain T. 1998. "Measuring the Dynamic Gains from Trade.” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2001 
 
Wacziarg, Romain, and Karen Horn Welch.  2003.  “Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence.”  
NBER Working Paper No. 10152. 
 
Warner, Andrew. 2003. "Once More into the Breach: Economic Integration.” Center for Global 
Development. Working Paper No. 34, 2003. Harvard Univeristy. 
 
World Bank. 1987. “World development report 1987 : barriers to adjustment and growth in the world 
economy; industrialization and foreign trade; world development indicators.” Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
 
_____ .2005. “World Development Indicators.” World Bank World Development Indicators Series. 
Washington, D.C. 
 
_____ .2006. “Assessing World Bank Support for Trade 1987-2004: An IEG Evaluation.” World Bank 






 32   
Appendix 1: Assessments of the Impact of Trade Policy Openness on Growth 
 
Study Openess Indicators Used Methodology Control Variables Conclusion of Study
WDR (1987) WDR (1987) Comparison of average rates of real GDP growth, 
among four categories of openness, based on 
subjective classification.
None Countries with outward oriented policies grow faster than 
those with inward oriented regimes.
Papageorgiou, 
Michaely, and Choksi 
(1991)
Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi (1991) Comparison of average rates of real GDP growth, 
before and after trade liberalization among groups 
of liberalizers classiffied according to strength and 
sustainability of reforms.
None If anything, trade reform-especially strong and fast reform-
is associated with higher growth from the beginning.
Dollar (1991) Dollar (1991) Cross country regression Investment rate Outward orientation is positively related to per capita GDP 
growth. 
Barro (1991) Barro (1991) Cross country regression with standard errors 
based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix. Additional 
estimations weight obervations by the levels of 
GDP and population.
Initial income, educational attainment, 
investment rate, government consumption, 
population size, price of investment goods, 
fertility rate, mortality rate, regional dummy, 
socialist system dummy, and political 
instability.
Distortions of investment price goods are adverse for 
growth
Sachs and Warner 
(1995)
Sachs and Warner Index (1995) Replicate Barro regression on cross country 
growth. Barro (1991)
Initial income, educational attainment, 
investment rate, government consumption, 
population density, price of investment 
goods, and political instability.
Open economies grow, on average, by 2.45 percentage 
points higher than closed economies, with a highly 
statistically significant effect
Harrison (1996)  Papageorgiou, et al (1991) Thomas et al 
(1990), Black market premium, Trade share of 
GDP, Bhalla and Lau (1992), Dollar (1991), 
and bias against agriculture from industrial 
sector protection  and overvaluation of the 
exchange rate (Schiff and Valdes, 1992)
OLS cross-country estimation and panel fixed 
effects.
Capital stock, years of primary and 
secondary education, population, labor 
force, arable land, and technological 
change.
Although the correlation across different types of 
openness is not always strong, there is generally a 
positive association between growth and different 
measures of openness. 
Wacziarg (1998) Wacziarg (1998) The model consists of a growth equation, an 
equation determining the nature of trade policy, 
and a series of channel equations describing the 
effects of trade policy on several growth 
determining variables. The parameters of the 
structural model are estimated jointly using three-
stage least squares.
Initial Income, black market premium, FDI, 
macro policy quality, human capital, 
regional and country group dummies, 
population size, population density, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, terms of 
trade, democratic government, postwar 
dummy, island dummy
Trade openness has a strong positive impact on economic 
growth
Edwards (1998) Sachs and Warner Index (1995); WDR 
(1987); Leamer (1998); Average Black Market 
premium; Average Import Tariffs; Coverage of 
Non Tariff Barriers; Heritage Foundation 
Index; Total revenue on trade taxes over total 
trade; Holger Wolf´s index
Cross country estimation through weighted least 
squares using GDP per capita in 1985 PPP dollars 
as weight, and also through instrumental weighted 
least squares. Openness is approximated through 
nine different variables.
Initial income per capita and human capital, 
property rights, political and 
macroeconomic stability.
More open countries have indeed experienced faster 
productivity growth and these results are robust to the use 
of openness indicator, estimation technique, time period 
and functional form. The only indicators whose coefficients 
do not reach conventional significance levels are Leamer's 
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Appendix 1 (cont): Assessments of the Impact of Trade Policy Openness on Growth
Study Openess Indicators Used Methodology Control Variables Conclusion of Study
Greenaway et al 
(1998)
Episode identification in Dean et al (1993), 
Sachs and Warner (1995), and World Bank 
(1993)
Use a very large data base and a panel framework 
together with a range of measures of liberalization 
and a more rigurous exploration of the dynamics 
of trade reform than hitherto. Panel estimation 
through dynamic GMM estimator (Arellando and 
Bond, 1991)
Initial income, educational attainment, 
investment rate, terms of trade, and 
population size.
Report a surprisingly consistent set of results both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. These suggest that 
liberalization and openness do impact favorably on the 
growth of GDP per capita. In the case of liberalization, the 
impact may not necesarily be straightforward and as 
theory suggests, the response is in all probability lagged. 
Morover, it is also relatively modest. That is not surprising 
since liberalizations vary in their depth and intensity and 
rarely ever amount to an intermediate shift to free trade.
Dollar and Kraay 
(2001)
Dollar and Kraay (2001) Cross country using OLS and instrumenting for 
dependent variables through lagged variables.
Growth in previous decade, FDI to GDP, 
Investment rate, Contract intensive money, 
government consumption, inflation, 
revolutions
Changes in trade volumes have a strong positive 
relationship to changes in growth rates
Wacziarg and Welch 
(2003)
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) based on Sachs 
and Warner (1995)
Replication of Sachs and Warner (1995) cross 
country exercise for a longer time period. 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) and 
Fixed Effects regression based on liberalization 
dates.
Initial income, educational attainment, 
investment rate, government consumption, 
population density, price of investment 
goods, and political instability.
The replication of SW for the 1990s leads to an openness 
coefficient that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
SUR estimates of openness coefficient are between 1.2 
and 1.4 and statistically different from zero for 1970-98, 
but again indistiguishable from zero for the 1990s. The 
fixed effects estimation however leads to openness 
coefficients that are significant for the period 1950-1998 
and actually higher for 1990-98.
Bosworth and Collins 
(2003)
Sachs and Warner (1995) Regression analysis (OLS) of the change in 
growth rates between two long time subperiods 
(1960-80 and 1980-2000)
Initial income per capita, human capital, 
(proxied by life expectancy in the initial 
year), changes in terms of trade, 
institutional quality, geography (number of 
frost days and tropical area), change in 
inflation, budget balance.
Their coefficient since the 1980s on the Sachs and Warner 
variable indicates a statistically significant increase of 0.82 
percentage point in per capita growth for open versus 
closed economies. In the 1960-70 period this coefficient 
was insignificant.
Bolaky and Freund 
(2004)
The logs of a) current total trade relative to 
current GDP in local currency and b) a PPP-
adjusted measure of trade to GDP
Cross-section OLS and IV using Frankel and 
Romer (1999) trade fitted values as an instrument 
for trade using a) levels b) decadal growth 
regressions.
Index of business and labor regulations, 
rule of law index, market size (natural log of 
population), landlock dummy, distance from 
the equator, legal origin
Both the levels and decadal growth regressions provide 
evidence that long-run growth is not helped, and may even 
be hampered, by trade in highly regulated economies.
Calderon, Loayza, and 
Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2004)
Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP GMM for dynamic models of panel data Average rate of secondary school 
enrollment, average ratio of private credit to 
GDP, average inflation rate to account for 
monetary discipline, and average ratio of 
government consumption to GDP, and 
foreign shocks variables.
The findings point toward non-monotonic effects of 
openness, in the sense that the growth effects of trade and 
inancial openness increase with the level of development, 
tapering off for high levels of income.
Chang, Kaltani, and 
Loayza (2005)
Dollar and Kraay (2001) Panel data growth regression using GMM 
procedure to control for endogeneity and 
unobserved country-specific factors.
Educational investment, financial depth, 
macroeconomic price stability, public 
infrastructure, governance, labor-market 
flexibility, ease of firm entry, and ease of 
firm exit.
The growth effects of openness are positive and 
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Appendix 2: Variables in Growth Equations 
Variables  How we account for them 
     
Convergence Term    
Income Per Capita  Included GDPTOUS in Multivariate Regression. 
Solow Model Variables    
Human Capital  Time trend captured through trend term or year dummies. 
Physical Capital  Included ll.igdp in one specification but not directly taken 
into account in most specifications. Assumed as an outcome 
of trade liberalization. 
Controls for Steady-State Growth Rate    
Geography  Dropped in fixed effects transformation since it is constant 
through time. 
Institutional Quality  Component related to Income per Capita captured through 
GDPTOUS. Any time trend captured through year dummies 
or time trend. Exclusion of transition countries from our 
sample. 
Life Expectancy  Component related to Income per Capita captured through 
GDPTOUS. Any time trend captured through year dummies 
or time trend. 
Population Size  Included in instrumental form through ll.lpop (logarithm, 
two-year lagged) 
Variables Affecting Growth, not the 
Steady-State Rate    
Real Exchange Rate Misalignment  RXRDEV 
Terms of Trade  LTOT 
Natural Disaster  DISAST 
World Demand Growth  Year Dummies 
Fiscal Balance  FBAL 
Current Account  CUR 
Inflation Reduction  INFG 
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Appendix 3: Episodes List                
                
Country Year  TAE  WW    Country  Year  TAE  WW 
                          
                
Argentina 1991  X  X    Malawi  1994  X   
Bangladesh 1992  X      Malaysia  1988  X   
Bangladesh 1995    X    Mali  1988  X  X 
Benin 1990  X  X    Mauritania  1995  X  X 
Bolivia 1985  X  X    Mexico  1986  X  X 
Brazil 1991  X  X    Morocco  1984  X  X 
Cameroon 1993  X  X    Nepal  1991  X  X 
Central African Republic  1994  X      Niger  1994  X  X 
Chile 1986  X      Pakistan  1991  X   
Costa Rica  1986  X  X    Pakistan  2001    X 
Cote d'Ivoire  1994  X  X    Panama  1991  X   
Dominican Republic  1992  X  X    Panama  1996    X 
Ecuador 1991  X  X    Paraguay  1989  X  X 
Ghana 1985  X  X    Philippines  1988  X  X 
Honduras 1991  X  X    Senegal  1994  X   
India 1991  X      South  Africa  1991  X  X 
Jamaica 1985  X  X    Thailand  1986  X   
Jordan 1994  X      Tunisia  1989  X  X 
Kenya 1993  X  X    Turkey  1982  X   
Korea, Rep.  1982  X      Turkey  1989    X 
Madagascar 1992  X      Uruguay  1990  X  X 
Madagascar 1996    X    Zambia  1993  X  X 
                          
TAE: Trade Assistance Evaluation (Jinjarak et al, forthcoming). SW: Sachs and Warner (1995). WW: Wacziarg 
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Appendix 4: Variables' Codes and Sources   
CODE  Variable  Source 
cur  Current account balance (% of GDP)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
debt  External debt (% of GNI)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
disast  Dummy for occurrence of a major natural disaster (1 if 
disaster incurred financial costs higher than 0.5% of 
GDP or affected more than 5% of the population, 0 
otherwise) 
OFDA/CRED Emergencies database 
fbal  Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
gdppcg  GDP growth per capita (annual %)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
gdptous 
Ratio of Country-to-US GNI per Capita at time=-1 
(Logarithm) 
World Development Indicators (2006) 
gnipcat  Gross National Income Per Capita (Atlas Method)  World Development Indicators (2006) 
igdp  Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP)  World Development Indicators (2006) 
ind  Industry, value added (% of GDP)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
inf  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
infg  Annual Change in the Inflation Rate (%)  World Development Indicators (2006) 
l.gdppcg 1 yr. lagged gdppcg (%)  World Development Indicators (2006) 
ll.igdp  igdp two year lagged  World Development Indicators (2006) 
ll.lpop  Population Size two-year lagged (logarithm)  World Development Indicators (2006) 
ltot  Logarithm of the Terms of Trade (TOT=100 in 2000)  World Development Indicators (2006) 
manx  Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
mgdp  Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
ntb  Frequency of Non-Tariff Barriers (% of Tariff Lines)  UNCTAD 
postini  Interaction of Postlib and average gdppcg in [-12,-5]  World Development Indicators (2006) 
postlib  Post-liberalization Dummy  Authors' estimates 
postpops  Interaction of Postlib and Population Size  World Development Indicators (2006) 
rxr  Real Effective Exchange Rate (2000=100)  World Development Indicators (2006) 
rxrdev  Real Exchange Rate (REER) misalignment (% of 
equilibrium REER) 
Elbadawi and Soto (forthcoming) 
tar  Unweighted Average Tariff (%, Ad-Valorem)  Trade Assistance Evaluation (IEG, 2006) 
tot  Annual Change in Terms of Trade (2000=100)  World Development Indicators (2006) 
wdemg  World Demand Growth, calcultated excluding country 
under consideration (% annual) 
World Development Indicators (2006) 
xcon  Exports Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index)  UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (Online) 
xgdp  Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)   World Development Indicators (2006) 
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In-
Sample














Argentina X LAC Middle Income Large Other X Other Non-Conflict
Bangladesh X SAR Low Income Large Other Manuf Non-Conflict
Benin X AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Bolivia X LAC Middle Income Small Landlocked X Fuel Non-Conflict
Brazil X LAC Middle Income Large Other X Manuf Non-Conflict
Cameroon X AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Central African Republic X AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict
Chile X LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Costa Rica X LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Cote d'Ivoire X AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Dominican Republic X LAC Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict
Ecuador X LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Ghana X AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Honduras X LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
India X SAR Low Income Large Other Manuf Non-Conflict
Jamaica X LAC Middle Income Small Island Manuf Non-Conflict
Jordan X MNA Middle Income Small Other Manuf Non-Conflict
Kenya X AFR Low Income Large Other Other Non-Conflict
Korea, Rep. X EAP Middle Income Large Other Manuf Non-Conflict
Madagascar X AFR Low Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict
Malawi X AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict
Malaysia X EAP Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Mali X AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict
Mauritania X AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Mexico X LAC Middle Income Large Other Man Non-Conflict
Morocco X AFR Middle Income Large Other Manuf Non-Conflict
Nepal X SAR Low Income Small Landlocked Manuf Non-Conflict
Niger X AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict
Pakistan X SAR Low Income Large Other Manuf Non-Conflict
Panama X LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Paraguay X LAC Middle Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict
Philippines X EAP Middle Income Large Island Other Non-Conflict
Senegal X AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
South Africa X AFR Middle Income Large Other Other Non-Conflict
Thailand X EAP Middle Income Large Other Other Non-Conflict
Tunisia X MNA Middle Income Small Other Manuf Non-Conflict
Turkey X ECA Middle Income Large Other Manuf Non-Conflict
Uruguay X LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict
Zambia X AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict
OUT-OF-SAMPLE
Afghanistan SAR No data Large Landlocked Other Conflict
Albania ECA Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Algeria MNA Middle Income Large Other Fuel Conflict
American Samoa EAP No data Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Angola AFR Low Income Small Other X Fuel Conflict
Armenia ECA Middle Income Small Landlocked X Other Non-Conflict X
Azerbaijan ECA Low Income Small Landlocked X Other Conflict X
Belarus ECA Middle Income Small Landlocked X Other Non-Conflict X
Belize LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Bhutan EAP Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Bosnia and Herzegovina ECA Middle Income Small Other Other Conflict X
Botswana AFR Middle Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Bulgaria ECA Middle Income Small Other X Other Non-Conflict X
Burkina Faso AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Burundi AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Conflict
Cambodia EAP Low Income Small Other Other Conflict
Cape Verde AFR Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Chad AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Conflict
China EAP Middle Income Large Other Other Non-Conflict X
Colombia LAC Middle Income Large Other Other Conflict
Comoros AFR Low Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Congo, Dem. Rep. AFR Low Income Large Other X Other Conflict
Congo, Rep. AFR Low Income Small Other Fuel Conflict
Croatia ECA Middle Income Small Other X Other Non-Conflict X
Cuba LAC No data Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Czech Republic ECA Middle Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Djibouti MNA Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Dominica LAC Middle Income Small Other Manuf Non-Conflict X
Egypt, Arab Rep. MNA Middle Income Large Other Fuel Non-Conflict
El Salvador LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Conflict
Equatorial Guinea AFR No data Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Eritrea AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Estonia ECA Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Ethiopia AFR Low Income Large Landlocked Other Conflict
Fiji EAP Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Gabon AFR Middle Income Small Other Fuel Non-Conflict X
name Reasons for Exclusion from Sample Main Characteristics
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Gambia, The AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Georgia ECA Low Income Small Other Other Conflict X
Grenada LAC Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Guatemala LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Conflict
Guinea AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Guinea-Bissau AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Guyana AFR Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Haiti LAC Low Income Small Island Manuf Non-Conflict X
Hungary ECA Middle Income Small Landlocked Manuf Non-Conflict X
Indonesia EAP Middle Income Large Island Fuel Non-Conflict
Iran, Islamic Rep. MNA Middle Income Large Other Other Conflict
Iraq MNA No data Small Other Other Conflict
Kazakhstan ECA Middle Income Small Landlocked X Other Non-Conflict X
Kiribati EAP Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Korea, Dem. Rep. EAP No data Large Other Other Non-Conflict X
Kyrgyz Republic ECA Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Lao PDR EAP Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Latvia ECA Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Lebanon MNA Middle Income Small Other Other Conflict
Lesotho AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict
Liberia AFR Low Income Small Other Other Conflict
Libya MNA No data Small Other Fuel Non-Conflict
Lithuania ECA Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Macedonia, FYR ECA Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Maldives SAR Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Marshall Islands EAP Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Mauritius AFR Middle Income Small Island Manuf Non-Conflict X
Mayotte AFR No data Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. EAP Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Moldova ECA Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Mongolia EAP Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Mozambique AFR Low Income Small Other Other Conflict
Myanmar EAP No data Large Other Other Conflict
N. Mariana Islands EAP No data Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Namibia AFR Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Nicaragua LAC Low Income Small Other X Other Conflict
Nigeria AFR Low Income Large Other Other Conflict
Oman MNA Middle Income Small Other Manuf Non-Conflict X
Palau EAP Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Papua New Guinea EAP Low Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Peru LAC Middle Income Large Other X Other Conflict
Poland ECA Middle Income Large Other Manuf Non-Conflict X
Romania ECA Middle Income Large Other Other Conflict X
Russian Federation ECA Middle Income Large Other Other Non-Conflict X
Rwanda AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Conflict
Samoa EAP Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Sao Tome and Principe AFR Low Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Saudi Arabia MNA Middle Income Small Other Fuel Non-Conflict
Serbia and Montenegro ECA Middle Income Small Other Manuf Non-Conflict X
Seychelles AFR Low Income Small Island Fuel Non-Conflict X
Sierra Leone AFR Low Income Small Other Other Conflict
Slovak Republic ECA Middle Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Solomon Islands EAP Low Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Somalia AFR Low Income Small Other Other Conflict
Sri Lanka SAR Middle Income Small Island Other Conflict
St. Kitts and Nevis LAC Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
St. Lucia LAC Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
St. Vincent and the Grenadines LAC Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Sudan AFR Low Income Large Other Other Conflict
Suriname LAC Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Swaziland AFR Middle Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Syrian Arab Republic MNA Middle Income Small Other Fuel Non-Conflict
Tajikistan ECA Low Income Small Landlocked Other Conflict X
Tanzania AFR Low Income Large Other Other Non-Conflict X
Timor-Leste EAP Low Income Small Island Manuf Non-Conflict X
Togo AFR Low Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Tonga EAP Middle Income Small Other Fuel Non-Conflict X
Trinidad and Tobago LAC Middle Income Small Island Fuel Non-Conflict
Turkmenistan ECA Middle Income Small Other Other Non-Conflict X
Uganda AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Conflict
Ukraine ECA Middle Income Large Other X Other Non-Conflict X
Uzbekistan ECA Low Income Large Other Other Non-Conflict X
Vanuatu EAP Middle Income Small Island Other Non-Conflict X
Venezuela, RB LAC Middle Income Large Other Fuel Non-Conflict
Vietnam EAP Low Income Large Other Other Non-Conflict X
West Bank and Gaza MNA Middle Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Yemen, Rep. MNA Low Income Small Other Manuf Conflict
Zimbabwe AFR Low Income Small Landlocked Other Non-Conflict X
Appendix 5: Classification of Developing Countries (continued)
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Appendix 6: Main Economic and Social Indicators In and Out of Sample 
          
      
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min  Max 
                 
          
Out-of-Sample        
General Indicators        
Gross National Income Per Capita (US$)  2239 1683.95 2066.98  80.91 18062.53
Inflation (% annual)  1910 75.52 702.66  -13.06 23773.13
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)  1249 -3.63 6.57  -64.49 20.63
Growth in External Debt (% Annual)  1934 81.36 105.64  0.00 1209.30
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)  1936 -5.36 11.30  -132.80 53.23
Growth in Real Exchange Rate (% Annual)  1755 1.74 29.35  -100.00 859.82
Growth in Terms of Trade (% Annual)  1750 0.86 15.40  -60.72 135.37
Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  2484 44.04 23.11  1.05 173.00
Unweighted Average Tariffs (%) 950 16.66 9.60  0.00 61.00
Frequency of Non-Tariff (% of tariff lines)  179 31.97 34.68  0.12 100.00
Regression Variables        
Growth in GDP per Capita (% Annual)  2706 1.38 8.13  -53.68 103.32
Investment (% of GDP)  2500 23.55 10.44  -17.38 113.58
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  2485 34.45 20.24  0.42 128.00
Industrial Value Added (% of GDP)  2405 29.86 14.23  0.00 88.92
Exports Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
Index) 901 0.41 0.24  0.05 1.00
Manufacturing Exports (% of Merchandise Exports)  1550 27.40 27.50  0.00 100.00
In-Sample        
General Indicators        
Gross National Income Per Capita (US$)  1250 1409.81 1637.57  115.70 13979.41
Inflation (% annual)  1155 44.72 389.67  -9.62 11749.64
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)  911 -3.47 4.55  -30.72 5.53
Growth in External Debt (% Annual)  1164 68.32 47.45  2.14 415.87
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)  1165 -4.06 5.60  -36.86 15.92
Growth in Real Exchange Rate (% Annual)  983 -1.28 11.70  -70.21 122.79
Growth in Terms of Trade (% Annual)  1242 -0.24 11.71  -64.35 73.96
Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  1442 34.19 20.90  2.98 139.00
Unweighted Average Tariffs (%) 673 21.52 15.13  5.10 107.00
Frequency of Non-Tariff (% of tariff lines)  197 29.84 31.09  0.10 100.00
Regression Variables        
Growth in GDP per Capita (% Annual)  1452 1.52 4.68  -19.96 27.87
Investment (% of GDP)  1446 21.09 7.39  3.15 66.38
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  1442 26.92 16.69  2.90 124.00
Industrial Value Added (% of GDP)  1411 27.04 8.96  6.25 59.84
Exports Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschmann 
Index)  713 0.32 0.17 0.08 0.85
Manufacturing Exports (% of Merchandise Exports)  1189 33.23 26.99  0.16 98.80
                 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006) and UNCTAD's Handbook of Statistics      40   
 








                    
            
Number of Countries  39 33 125  14  31  139 
General Indicators            
Gross National Income Per Capita (US$)  1409.81 765.54 1930.97  1668.33  1872.16  1495.56 
Inflation (% annual)  44.72 197.23 107.11  644.78  9.40  69.73 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)  -3.47 -3.50 -1.97  -3.99  -2.51  -3.20 
Growth in External Debt (% Annual)  68.32 102.17 48.66  109.02  95.79  81.54 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)  -4.06 -5.67 -4.10  -7.25  -7.86  -4.90 
Growth in Real Exchange Rate (% Annual)  -1.28 4.09 3.79  8.83  0.07  0.78 
Growth in Terms of Trade (% Annual)  -0.24 2.53 1.01  1.07 -0.10  0.88 
Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  34.19 29.19 47.74  33.80  67.01  42.95 
Regression Variables            
Growth in GDP per Capita (% Annual)  1.52 0.46 2.63  0.40  1.68  1.44 
Investment Growth (% Annual)  21.09 4.37 2.36  5.14  0.96  2.30 
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  26.92 22.07 41.12  28.32  47.87  32.88 
Industrial Value Added (% of GDP)  27.04 27.59 35.07  33.99  23.13  27.10 
Exports Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index)  0.32 0.42 0.17  0.23  0.56  0.34 
Manufacturing Exports (% of Merchandise Exports)  33.23 20.16 61.71  32.99  23.78  38.97 
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Appendix 8: GDP Per Capita Growth by Country Subgroups 
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Appendix 8 (continued) 
GDP Per Capita Growth by Country Subgroups 
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Appendix 9: Main Economic and Social Indicators Before and After Trade Liberalization 
          
      
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
                 
          
Pre Liberalization (Years [-12,-5])         
General Indicators         
Gross National Income Per Capita (US$)  289  981.37  784.89  131.84  3649.39 
Inflation (% annual)  249  29.39  71.83  -6.87  672.18 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)  245  -4.43  4.35  -21.63  5.41 
Growth in External Debt (% Annual)  269  10.42  21.30  -40.21  137.58 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)  279  -5.69  5.02  -29.75  9.32 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (2000=100)  220  152.84  63.36  47.56  794.76 
Terms of Trade (2000=100)  271  115.45  36.30  54.04  313.39 
Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  311  29.42  16.06  4.76  91.50 
Unweighted Average Tariffs (%)  93  34.35  22.43  6.00  102.00 
Frequency of Non-Tariff (% of tariff lines)  30  55.02  28.94  6.60  96.10 
Regression Variables         
Growth in GDP per Capita (% Annual)  312  0.92  4.87  -19.94  14.26 
Investment (% of GDP)  312  20.41  6.46  3.15  38.26 
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  311  23.88  14.74  3.28  98.20 
Industrial Value Added (% of GDP)  303  27.54  9.76  9.86  49.42 
Exports Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index)  115  0.36  0.15  0.11  0.75 
Manufacturing Exports (% of Merchandise Exports)  255  26.16  21.24  0.78  87.40 
          
Post Liberalization (Years [2,9])         
General Indicators         
Gross National Income Per Capita (US$)  312  1624.45  1715.67  156.75  8173.16 
Inflation (% annual)  310  25.91  160.40  -6.24  2075.89 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)  222  -1.86  3.49  -20.13  4.72 
Growth in External Debt (% Annual)  300  -1.54  14.17  -37.83  78.43 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)  281  -3.39  3.77  -17.62  9.68 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (2000=100)  307  102.35  19.41  59.78  184.26 
Terms of Trade (2000=100)  273  103.05  14.08  70.60  190.43 
Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  312  35.01  17.90  9.10  98.10 
Unweighted Average Tariffs (%)  269  16.76  8.32  5.40  51.00 
Frequency of Non-Tariff (% of tariff lines)  67  23.52  33.47  0.10  100.00 
Regression Variables         
Growth in GDP per Capita (% Annual)  312  2.11  3.35  -7.99  11.63 
Investment (% of GDP)  312  21.22  6.99  4.30  43.64 
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)  312  29.53  16.86  6.91  101.00 
Industrial Value Added (% of GDP)  304  26.67  7.51  9.22  44.57 
Exports Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index)  255  0.31  0.17  0.08  0.85 
Manufacturing Exports (% of Merchandise Exports)  288  41.60  27.98  0.53  98.80 
                 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006) and UNCTAD's Handbook of Statistics 
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Appendix 10: Change in GDP per capita growth 
from years [-12,-5] to [2,9] 
Country  Period 
Jamaica 7.53












Korea, Rep.  2.07








Costa Rica  0.73
Senegal 0.71
Central African Republic  0.59
Benin 0.59
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Appendix 11: Impact of Trade Liberalization on GDP Per Capita 
Growth (Using Wacziarg and Welch Liberalization Years) 











   Independent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth 
postlib 1.457  1.134 2.625 2.894
   (4.69)**  (3.16)** (3.25)** (2.36)*
trend       -0.173  
        (2.06)*  
Constant -0.007  0.435 -0.124 0.112
   (0.03)  (1.74) (0.34) (0.03)
Observations 671  485 485 485
Number of 
countries 31  31 31 31
R-squared 0.03  0.02 0.03 0.15
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Appendix 12: Impact of Trade Liberalization on GDP Per Capita 
Growth 
   Using Year Dummies 
  
Independent Variable: GDP Per Capita 
Growth 
postlib 2.768 2.051 1.58 
   (4.29)** (3.22)** (2.36)* 
gdptous -2.102 (1.575) (1.412) 
   (2.66)** (1.98)* (1.68) 
postpops -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
   (1.73) (2.03)* (1.76) 
postini -0.116 -0.081 -0.025 
   (0.85) (0.59) (0.17) 
rxrdev -0.015 -0.002 0.007 
   (2.69)** (0.26) (0.74) 
disast -1.011 -0.694 -0.546 
   (2.32)* (1.63) (1.24) 
infg -0.386 -0.576 -0.579 
   (2.06)* (2.82)** (2.72)** 
l.rxrdev   -0.017 0.7 
     (2.20)* (1.59) 
l.disast   0.654 -0.448 
     (1.52) (2.08)* 
l.infg   -0.391 -0.03 
     (1.95) (2.61)** 
ll.rxrdev     0.012 
       (1.46) 
ll.disast     0.177 
       (0.4) 
ll.infg     -0.17 
       (0.81) 
Constant -4.406 -7.515 -7.69 
   -1.85 (2.37)* (3.07)** 
Observations 625 565 516 
Number of countries  37 37 36 
R-squared 0.17 0.20 0.20 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       47
 
Appendix 13: Impact of Trade Liberalization on GDP Per Capita Growth by Country Group (Deleting [-4,1]) 






















Income Small  Large  Fast  Gradual 
   Dependent Variable: GDP Per Capita Growth 
                                   
postlib 1.121  1.423 1.446 1.497 0.697 1.229  1.164 1.713 0.151 0.691 1.591
   (2.13)*  (2.55)* (2.57)* (1.09) (1.03) (2.63)**  (2.96)** (4.39)** (0.34) (1.50) (3.84)**
Constant -0.326  4.638 0.748 0.316 2.079 0.041  1.591 0.136 2.474 1.045 0.6
   (0.87)  (11.75)** (1.88) (0.33) (4.35)** (0.12)  (5.73)** (0.49) (7.85)** (3.21)** (2.05)*
Observations 240  64 208 32 64 272  352 416 208 272 336
Number of countries  15  4 13 2 4 17  22 26 13 17 21
R-squared 0.02  0.1 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03  0.03 0.05 0 0.01 0.04
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses                   










    